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ALD-123        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-4632 
___________ 
 
MARC ANTWAIN X. RIVERS MUHAMMAD, SR., 
     Appellant 
v. 
 
YVETTE DAVIS; THE LUZERNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC WELFARE; THE LUZERNE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON 
PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION; DONALD T. ROGERS, Esquire; 
MRS. PAULA DEJOSEPH, Esquire, Hearing Officer;  
JOHN LEIGHTON, Conference Officer 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-01292) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 1, 2012 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 12, 2012) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
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Marc Antwain X. Rivers Muhammad, Sr., appeals, pro se, the District Court’s 
order dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Because we 
conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  See 
3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Plaintiff Marc Antwain X. Rivers Muhammad, Sr., had a son with defendant 
Yvette Davis in February 2009.  In June 2009, the Luzerne Court of Common Pleas 
Domestic Relations Section ordered Muhammad to make monthly child support 
payments.  Muhammad challenged the order on constitutional grounds and was given a 
new trial.  The hearing officer adjusted his payments, but determined that his 
constitutional claims were beyond her jurisdiction.  The Superior Court denied his second 
appeal.  In July 2011, Muhammad filed a pro se complaint against Davis and the 
remaining defendants.  He claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3) and § 1983, that the 
order that he pay child support to Davis violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to 
privacy.  He also asserts that the defendants used the administrative and judicial process 
in furtherance of their conspiracy to deprive him of his rights.   
 The Magistrate Judge reviewed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B), and recommended that it be dismissed.  After considering Muhammad’s 
objections, the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation, including its 
recommendation that leave to amend be denied for futility, and dismissed the case.  
Muhammad filed a timely notice of appeal.   
3 
 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Summary action is warranted if an appeal presents no 
substantial question.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
III. 
 As the District Court noted, to state a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 
1985(2) or (3), Muhammad must allege that the conspirators intended to deny him equal 
protection of the laws.  See § 1985; see also Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 
1997).  Muhammad alleged in his complaint that the defendants conspired to deprive him 
of equal protection of the laws by forcing him to pay child support in violation of his 
right to privacy.   
The District Court correctly found there is no legal basis to extend the definition of 
privacy in the way Muhammad seeks.  Rather, the state’s interest in child welfare is 
sufficiently compelling to overcome a claim challenging a support order on privacy 
grounds.  See N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004).  Accordingly, the child 
support order is not unconstitutional, and Muhammad’s complaint does not allege a 
deprivation of equal protection of the laws. 
Finally, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that it would be futile to allow Muhammad to file an amended complaint.  
See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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IV. 
 Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
 
 
